نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی مستقل
نویسندگان
1 استادیار، گروه حقوق بین الملل، واحد دشتستان، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، دشتستان، ایران
2 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق بین الملل عمومی، گروه حقوق، واحد بوشهر، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، بوشهر، ایران و کارشناس ارشد مترجمی زبان انگلیسی،
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
This study seeks to analyze the phenomenon of the “Asymmetric Deterrence Paradox” within the framework of the “Axis of Resistance” network in opposition to the United States, and to evaluate the normative capacity of the international legal system to regulate and attribute responsibility to this pattern. This research employs a hybrid legal-interdisciplinary methodology, including systematic legal interpretation, structural analysis of asymmetric deterrence, and a comparative case study of four major groups: Hezbollah of Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) of Iraq, Ansar Allah of Yemen, and Palestinian groups. The data relies on international judicial practice, International Law Commission (ILC) documents, UN resolutions, and specialized literature. The findings indicate that Tehran’s relations with these networks form a heterogeneous spectrum ranging from structural dependency to strategic partnership with tactical autonomy. Therefore, neither of the classic criteria “effective control” or “overall control” can uniformly attribute the acts of these groups to Iran. The fundamental conflict between tactical efficiency and international legal responsibility constitutes the core of this paradox. Current international legal regimes, particularly regarding self-defense and the “unwilling or unable” doctrine, possess serious gaps in addressing this proxy strategy. Regulating this requires a structural review and the development of an intermediate attribution standard.
کلیدواژهها English