Iran's multi-dimensional deterrence tools—including its potential nuclear power, missile capabilities, and regional influence—created a strategic paradox during the period of the maximum pressure policy. These capabilities, by raising the costs of war, deterred full-scale military aggression and established relative deterrence. However, in line with the logic of offensive neorealism and uncertainty regarding intentions, instead of achieving grand deterrence, they became a driver for the escalation of multilateral pressures and ultimately an attack on nuclear facilities. Thus, the main research question is: How did Iran's multi-dimensional deterrence tools, rather than stabilizing the balance and reducing tension, reinforce the drivers of pressure and lead to the formation of a deterrence paradox? The hypothesis is that the lack of grand deterrence and the asymmetric perception of Iran's power led the United States to perceive Iran's multi-dimensional deterrence tools, especially its potential nuclear capacity, as a growing threat, and thus intensified the policy of pressure and containment. The research findings indicate that this paradox results from a self-reproducing cycle in which the asymmetric perception of the US and Iran's internal limitations hindered the credibility of deterrence. The research method is analytical-explanatory with a qualitative approach based on the process-tracing technique.