This study examines the psychological dimensions of crisis escalation between Iran and the Israeli regime, aiming to explain how perceptual patterns in their foreign policies have contributed to escalation and ultimately to preemptive action. The central question concerns how the strategic logic of crisis management, within the context of threat perception, reproduces the security dilemma and increases the likelihood of aggressive behavior. Drawing on Robert Jervis’s theoretical framework, the study conceptualizes threat not merely as a material variable but as a perceptual phenomenon, emphasizing the role of cognitive biases in shaping elites’ interpretations of the security environment. Methodologically, the research employs qualitative content analysis with a thematic approach, analyzing official statements and positions of decision-makers during the conflict. To enhance validity, a portion of the data was independently coded and cross-checked. The findings suggest that the logic of preemption is driven less by deliberate offensive planning than by perceptual misinterpretations and threat-laden readings of environmental signals. In particular, reliance on “surprise trauma” leads to the reinterpretation of defensive measures as preparations for attack, generating a self-fulfilling cycle of escalation and undermining rational crisis management.