The United States, after occupying Iraq in 2003, initiated economic reform policies known as structural adjustment in the country. However, the outcomes of these reforms over the past two decades have raised serious questions about their effectiveness. The present study, using the theoretical framework of neoliberalism and econometric methods, examines the relationship between economic reforms and development indicators in Iraq.

The results indicate that the structural adjustment approach, based on neoliberal principles, has failed to deliver on its promises of economic growth, reducing unemployment, and rebuilding Iraq. In fact, the reforms implemented by the Central Bank of Iraq under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund regarding the exchange rate (Iraqi dinar) from 2003 to 2023 have not reduced unemployment; on the contrary, they have contributed to its increase. Reforms related to investment laws and the granting of loans and credit facilities to investors have also had no effect on economic growth or reducing unemployment in Iraq during the same period.

These findings suggest that the way out of Iraq's economic crisis is not to follow the policies of the Washington Consensus, but rather to plan for diversifying the economy to achieve independence from its current economic structure.