Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East: case study Syrian crisis

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Abstract

This article analyze Turkey's aggressive foreign policy in the face of the Syrian crisis with an explanatory method and from the perspective of defensive realism. Therefore, the main question of the research is, why Turkey's foreign policy in the Syrian crisis is aggressive? The temporary answer is that Turkey, by perceiving the threat of extremists spilling over into its internal borders, threatening the autonomy of the Syrian Kurds, as well as Turkey's long-term geopolitical prospects, has led its aggressive foreign policy in the Syrian crisis. The findings of the study indicate that as the crisis intensifies near the Turkish border, Turkish decision-makers have increased the level of military violence in the Syrian crisis. In other words, there is a positive correlation between the extent to which Turkey receives a threat from the Syrian crisis, and the degree to which its foreign policy is becoming more aggressive. The method of data collection in this research is based on the library method which includes the simultaneous use of domestic and foreign scientific articles.

Key words: Turkey, Syria, Defensive realism, Foreign policy, Middle East

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**Introduction**

Syria is one of the countries where the interaction of the three factors of geography, power and politics has led to the formation of a kind of international competition to influence and manage the internal events of this country. Syria is part of the great Levant, bordering Lebanon, Cyprus, Occupied Palestine, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. It has been competing ideologically and politically with the Ba'athist government in Iraq for years, and has been at loggerheads with the Turkish government over Kurdish issues as well as geographical factors. Due to Syria's strategic role, many international relations scholars such as Fridman in 2016, call "Syria the largest small country in the world." With the onset of the crisis in the country in 2011, many regional and trans-regional actors have chosen a variety of approaches and orientations to the crisis based on their interests, goals and geographical location. Meanwhile, the efforts of some governments to put pressure on the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government are among the obvious manifestations of the developments in Syria. In the meantime, Turkey, considering its history, culture, religion and many other commonalities, is one of the countries that has played an active role in these developments and is trying to introduce itself as a model, currents. Steer the current in a direction that is in line with the wishes and views of the Turkish government. With the rise of the AKP in 2002, a new era in Turkish political life seemed to have taken hold, and the Turkish government began new regional policies by moderating extremist Westernism. However, due to the new developments in the Arab world and in spite of Turkey's active policy in this regard, these developments have created challenges for the regional policies of this country. The Syrian crisis has affected Turkey's security and national interests at the domestic, regional and international levels. Turkey's approach, which at the beginning of the crisis was by Bashar al-Assad inviting opposition groups to the Syrian government to negotiate and carry out political reforms, gradually turned into full-scale opposition to the Assad government and the start of Turkish military operations in Syria. The question now is what is the reason for this change in Turkey's foreign policy in the Syrian crisis. The answer is that Turkey has taken a more violent approach to safeguarding and expanding its interests in Syria, recognizing the severity of the threats it has posed to its interests and national security during the Syrian crisis. The method of data collection in this research is based on the library method which includes the simultaneous use of domestic and foreign scientific articles and method of research is explanatory description method.
1. Research literature

So far, several scholars have researched the foreign policy behavior of the Turkish government. For example, Hossein Moradian (2015) in an article entitled Potential Threat of Wick against Iran is measuring the national power of Turkey and its neighbors. Based on the Fox model, this researcher has introduced Turkey and then Iran as regional powers among the eight neighboring countries of Turkey and that country itself. Also, Mohammad Ebrahimpour (2017) in an article with "Turkey's new policies in the Middle East, Turkey's new role based on the new definition of its position in the region, the impact of this component on Turkey's foreign policy has been evaluated. Regarding the effect of the structure of the international system on the behavior of countries and also determining the position of governments in the international system, Also in the article by Saeed Jahangiri and Nasser Grossi entitled "Study and comparison of Iranian and Turkish foreign policy on the developments in Syria (dimensions and approaches)", these authors discuss the consequences of the Syrian crisis for the Turkish and Iranian governments and believe that the Syrian crisis in government relations Has created tensions in the region. These consequences have required different types of behavior and orientations from these two governments.

Abdullah Ghanbarlou's article entitled "National Security and Westernization Considerations in Turkish Foreign Policy (2012)" explains the developments in Turkish foreign policy in the last two decades and considers national security concerns as the most important reason for the change in Turkish foreign policy. He attributes Turkey's foreign domination and internal divergence to Turkey's specific geopolitics, which has led to Turkey's reliance on the West. Also in another article by Hamed Yaghoubifar entitled Typology of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East (2013), the shift of Turkish foreign policy from Kemalist to active and interventionist policy has been studied. Also, in an article by Saeed Jahangiri and Nasser Grossi in the Quarterly Journal of Political Strategy entitled "Study and Comparison of Foreign Policy of Iran and Turkey on the Developments in Syria (Dimensions and Approaches) (2015)", the authors examine the developments in Syria and then examine the approaches of Iran and Turkey has dealt with this crisis and has attributed the root of the foreign policy differences between the two governments to the historical differences between Iran and Turkey and their goals and perspectives. A review of these and many other articles shows that the authors have mainly explored the reasons for the geopolitical and security goals of changing Turkey's foreign
policy after the AKP came to power, but what the author is focusing on in this article is the government's fear. Davutoğlu is one of the possible victories of the extremists in Syria. Paying attention to the issue of the Turkish government's perception of the threat, or in other words, its misunderstanding of the possible threats of the Syrian crisis, has forced the government to make aggressive decisions in its foreign policy in this crisis.

2. Theoretical framework: Defensive Realism

Defensive realists also pay attention to the relationship between anarchy and international implications, on the one hand, and the behavior of governments, on the other, but see this relationship as more complex. Defensive realism assumes that international anarchy is usually benign, meaning that security is not uncommon and abundant. As a result, governments that realize this will not behave aggressively and will only react to it when they feel there is a threat against them, and this reaction is often only at the level of balancing and deterring the threat (Moshirzadeh, 2005: 133). Stephen Walt, the designer of the threat balance theory, has proposed a new formulation of Waltz power balance theory. Walt begins by asking what security should be against. He believes that security is more about threats than about power. Walt believes that threat, not power, is at the heart of governments' security concerns, and that governments are not necessarily afraid of the most powerful government, but of governments that appear more threatening than any other. The threat is, in a sense, a function of geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, aggressive intentions, and the overall power of a state. It is difficult to understand the real intentions of governments, and the intentions of governments may change (Walt, 1987, 28). Geographical proximity plays a decisive role in the threat-making and "perception of threat" of countries, so that countries are neighbors. The powerful themselves fear and feel threatened more than the powerful countries that are far away from them. For example, Ukraine feels more threatened by Russia than Italy (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2014: 234). In general, governments face two major strategies when faced with a major threat: they either choose a balance of power strategy or are forced to pursue a one-size-fits-all strategy. Balance means uniting with others against threats, and pursuit means joining the threatened state to the source of danger or the most threatening state. Walt says that alliances and alliances are formal or informal commitments to security cooperation between two or more governments that are made to increase the power and influence and ultimately the security of member states, although these patterns of
cooperation are based on distinct arrangements. But they all share an essential element in common: the commitment to mutual support against some of the other actors in the international system (Walt, 2008, 9). Stephen Walt emphasizes the importance of the balance of threat, rather than the balance of power. It recognizes a set of government offensive powers, military capabilities, geographical proximity, and possible intentions for state aggression. Therefore, power alone is not important, and other factors are also important. Governments strike a balance between those states that pose an immediate threat to their very existence or interests. It is important that their perception of each other is a threat and not merely the power of each of them. Governments balance against those states that are an immediate threat to their existence or interests (Moshirzadeh, 2005: 135).

This theory seeks to explain why and under what conditions the internal characteristics of countries, the ability to extract and mobilize the resources of political-military institutions, the influence of domestic social actors and interest groups, the level and degree of government autonomy from society and the level And the cohesion of political or social elites, foreign policy decision-makers' perceptions of international threats and opportunities, and policies that They define and pursue, intervene and mediate (Lobill, 2009: 15). Therefore, from the perspective of neoclassical realism, understanding the relationship between the distribution of relative power and foreign policy requires a study of both domestic and international contexts in which foreign policy is formulated and Foreign policy requires the study of both domestic and international contexts in which foreign policy is formulated and implemented. Thus, the characteristics of countries and their decision-makers and countries' views on how to use power mediate structural constraints and foreign policy behavior. Therefore, in the analysis of policy makers in extracting resources to pursue and achieve foreign policy goals should be considered (Elman, 2007: 16). Thus, according to threat balance theory, countries facing external threats generally strike a balance against the threatening country or coalition. In general, threatened countries endanger the balance of power in the long run by threatening power and the survival of successive countries. However, despite the prevalence and preference of balancing over the pursuit of many weak countries, they may have no choice but to follow the lead of the powerful expansionist country. Because falling with this power of development ends at the cost of their dissolution and extinction (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2015: 235).
3. Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East

In the last decade, Turkish leaders have adopted different foreign policy perceptions in each period with different mental and perceptual perceptions. For a long time, especially during the Cold War, the West and the East became the main focus of Turkish foreign policy, and despite its historical, cultural and geographical structure, the East and the Middle East did not have much of a place in the country and its foreign policy. Ibn Marr can be attributed in part to the characteristics of the Cold War that the structure of the international system imposed political and security orientations on them, and Turkey was relatively indifferent to the Middle East under these circumstances, and the end of the Cold War. It provided an opportunity for the leaders of this country to reconsider, to draw new goals and interests for themselves with a new understanding of international and regional developments. With the inauguration of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and the design of the "strategic depth" doctrine, Turkey's foreign policy took on a new twist. The reversal of Turkey's foreign policy after the AKP came to power is due to the elites' resistance to international and regional realities, influenced by internal factors on the one hand and external factors on the other. Turkey's new behavior in the region is strongly influenced by the thoughts and norms of Ahmad Davutoglu. Davutoğlu's mental assumptions in presenting foreign policy are influenced by his academic activities and perceptions of Turkish history during the Cold War decade. Turkey's new foreign policy and its perception of Turkey's role as a regional power is crystallized in the book Strategically Important Depth (Kardash, 2017: 124)

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey should change its role step by step in order to achieve a global role (Davutoğlu, 2006: 142). Turkey initially sought to increase its political-economic-security influence in Syria by strengthening the ISIS front in the Syrian conflict. In this regard, with the military development of opposition groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army on Syrian soil, the Turkish government considered this issue a historic opportunity to exert its political influence to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad and form a government close to Turkish policies. Increase Turkey's influence in the region and the Palestinian-Lebanese conflicts, and diminish the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a rival Islamic country in the region. It is hypothesized that the AKP took an important step in creating tensions with its neighbors in the region by pursuing a policy of zero problems with its neighbors, but the choice of contradictory obstacles in practice has been met with criticism and
opposition from parties and civil and social groups. According to defensive realism, one of the factors of power of countries is the policy of domestic supply, which means internal cohesion between the government and public opinion and civic groups. Opposition parties and groups of people have argued that the Turkish government's policies have jeopardized the country's credibility, interests and security. The most important challenge for the Turkish government in foreign supply should be to choose protectionist positions against terrorist acts in Iraq and Syria. The Turkish government's support for terrorists has raised serious doubts in public opinion and in the region's elites about the true nature of Turkey's foreign policy goals. In addition to Muslim countries in the Middle East, including Iran, Ankara's contradictory stance has angered Turkey's party allies, particularly the United States.

This problem began when Turkey was at a crossroads between cooperating with terrorists and joining the anti-IS coalition. On the one hand, Turkey was forced to support the coalition military operations against the terrorist groups of ISIL and Al-Nusra, on the other hand, it sought to pave the way for the fall of the Iraqi and Syrian governments by supporting terrorists (Ghahramanpour, 2008). After despairing of Damascus starting the process of structural reform and escalating violence, Ankara ignored all considerations related to the principle of tension in regional relations and set up camps in various ways, such as hosting opponents of the Assad regime in the form of the Syrian National Council. The Syrian refugees, the reception of some refugee soldiers and the provision of weapons to the Free Syrian Army and the holding of international meetings, sought to overthrow Bashar al-Assad's friend. This change in attitude towards Syria came at a time when the Erdogan government's most important relations established political and economic ties with Damascus and also provided significant support to Syria to break the political isolation of Damascus after the assassination of Rafik Hariri (Cornell, 2012: 14).

In fact, the policy of looking to the West, along with little attention to regional considerations, continued until the early 1960s. At this time, the Turkish political apparatus was faced with new domestic and international variables, which resulted in a new process with regional tendencies in Turkish foreign policy. With the rise of the AKP, Turkey has turned its attention to Middle East issues and sought to play a more active role in regional issues. Of course, Turkey's focus on Middle East affairs does not mean that it has turned away from its Western allies (Barkey, 2011: 18). Turkey has an important position in Western institutions, especially NATO,
and despite the strengthening of Islamism in recent years, Westerners have acknowledged that structural changes have taken place in Turkey's security environment since the Cold War. Undoubtedly, Turkey today faces more confrontational security challenges and threats, mainly located in the southern part of the country. Perhaps this has been instrumental in forcing Turkey to become more involved in developments in the Middle East.

Unlike in the past, when Turkey turned its attention to the West, it seeks to play a special role in regional politics by using its geopolitical position and its relations with the West and the Middle East. In recent years, Turkey has made significant progress in pursuing a policy of "zero tension with its neighbors" and enjoying a dynamic economy and historical ties with the region. But in 2011 it lost some of its independence of action and has largely aligned US policy with developments in the Middle East. Even now, due to the new developments in the Arab world and in spite of Turkey's active policy in this regard, these developments have created challenges for the regional policy of this country.

3-I. Turkey's foreign policy in Syria

Turkey has been an important regional player in the Syrian crisis, and its orientation has played an important role in deepening the crisis. According to the philosophy of the founders of the Republic of Turkey, the policy of attitude towards the West as the first principle of Kemalism had greatly influenced the position of Turkish foreign policy in the face of regional competition; After the Second World War, the Middle East region and its developments were of secondary importance to Turkey's foreign policy.

Global developments, especially after the beginning of the Islamic Awakening in the Arab and North African countries, shifted Turkey's policy in 2011 from "zero with neighbors" to "tension with neighbors". To this end, it must be acknowledged that Turkey's foreign policy in the face of domestic developments in Syria has taken a different trend than other actors. From the very first days of Assad's opposition protests, the Turkish government began to support the opposition and, while encouraging and pressuring the Syrian government to make reforms in some cases, took a relatively moderate stance on dealing with the opposition. The Turkish government may have common positions with the Syrian government on Kurdish issues and the fight against terrorism, but has taken steps to support opponents of Bashar al-Assad's government, including setting up refugee camps for dissidents within its borders with Syria. Nine leaders of the Syrian opposition in Istanbul, under the name of the Syrian National Liberation Council, made diplomatic efforts to persuade Syria to pursue democratic reforms. On the other hand, the
country, which is concerned about the instability of instability overflowing from its borders into Syria, has deployed the Patriot missile system on the southern borders of Syria with the aim of defending against the Syrian air threat. A statement issued by the Pentagon stated that in addition to neutralizing security threats from Syria, the Turkish government aimed to counter Russia's military presence in Syria and prevent the strengthening of the country's air defense system (Asgarian, Tajri, 2017: 26)

The result of Turkey's foreign policy in the face of the Syrian crisis can be seen as "acceptance of the reality" that has forced Ankara to reconsider its interventionist policies. In addition to the transit of armed elements from different countries to Syria, Turkey also provided bases to these elements along the kilometer of the common border, and a number of commanders of armed organizations active in Syria led the affairs from these bases. Training courses for these groups were also held in Turkey, and some of the armed wounded during the conflict were even transported to Turkey for treatment. With the start of the Syrian crisis, Turkey supported Syrian terrorist and extremist groups, including ISIS. Following the emergence of ISIS as an international terrorist group, Turkey has chosen to change its official position. To date, Turkey's strategic priority has been to overthrow the Syrian government, which sees mere action against ISIL as a serious possibility of retaliatory ISIL terrorist attacks on Syrian soil and a stronger Syrian government. Also, ISIL, as the enemy of the Syrian government, continues to serve the interests of Turkey. In the case of the Kurds, Turkey's policy is to prevent the Kurds from gaining power in Syria, which is in an unwritten alliance with the Syrian government. Especially since the Turkish government is fundamentally opposed to the rise of the Kurds in the region (Yesiltas, 2015: 23)

In analyzing Turkey's approach to the Syrian crisis, two important periods of time must be considered: the first period from the beginning of the crisis (2011) to (2016), during which Turkey tried to change the regime in Syria through military intervention. From August 2016 until 2020, Turkish military intervention was launched to control the activities of PKK-affiliated militants. Of course, in this regard, it should be said that Turkey was ready to cooperate with the Assad government in the event of a joint confrontation on both sides against the Kurdish movement known as Rojava, which is considered by the armed militias (Al-Nusra, ISIL) And Ahrar al-Sham) The Syrian government did not implement the Turkish deal. To this end, Turkey, considering its security and interests, launched a military intervention in Syria called Operation Euphrates Shield. The operation was carried out with the participation of the
Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East … / Mahdyeh Heydari

Free Syrian Army, which has so far taken control of an area of about 2,000 square kilometers in northwestern Syria. Turkey's military intervention in the Syrian crisis was the result of a stalemate in their strategies and goals from 2011 to 2016. During these years, the country simultaneously pursued three strategies to oust Assad from power by arming the opposition, helping the Muslim Brotherhood gain power, and preventing the formation of an autonomous Kurdish government in northeastern Syria. All three strategies failed miserably. Assad's position became more stable. Due to the rise of ISIS and Al-Nusra, the Muslim Brotherhood has completely disappeared from the Syrian political and military space, and the Turks, on the other hand, have seen the growing power of the Kurds in the border corner. The outcome of these events led to the conclusion in the Justice and Development Party that there is no other way but direct intervention to implement strategies (Alaranta, 2017: 2).

Thus, the close ties of the opposition groups with Turkey have paved the way for the further role of this country in Syria. Turkey sought to find a model similar to the Iraqi federal system, given the similarity of the situation in Syria to Iraq in terms of existing social gaps. In this way, the potential threat from the Syrian Kurds will be managed to some extent. Turkey, on the other hand, hopes for a full-fledged presence in Syria in the future in terms of economic investment, given the destruction of its infrastructure due to the civil war (Hesam Ghazi, Nouri, 1396: 90).

4. Threats of the Syrian crisis to Turkey from the perspective of its decision-makers

4-1. Overflow of instability and extremism in Turkey

The attraction and presence of Turkish citizens in the heart of this terrorist group promises the spread of terrorist crises in Turkey in the near future. Perhaps some of the leaders of the Justice and Development Party tried to exploit Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in order to achieve their party's foreign policy, and of course they did not believe in the ideology and beliefs of these groups, but it seems that today they are being held hostage. Some have become in the hands of these extremist groups. The most important legacies of ISIL for the new foreign policy and for the presidency of the Republic of Erdogan are: 1. Endangering Turkey's public image in the eyes of the world from a human rights perspective, 2. The polarization of Turkish society and its destructive consequences on economic, social and political security. 3. Expansion of extremist and jihadist groups in Turkey while the case of Kurdish ethnic groups is being collected; 4. Turkey's further isolationism in the Middle East and the deepening of its challenge to the
influential powers of the Middle East, such as Erat; 5. Turkey being challenged by ISIS due to illusory analyzes of the caliphate. The security consequence of the presence of extremist groups in Syria has also affected Turkey; For example, a bomb blast in Istanbul, a metropolitan area of Turkey with a population of 14 million, killed ten people, nine of whom were German tourists. But the suicide bombing suddenly made headlines around the world. Turkish Prime Minister and Justice and Development Party leader Ahmet Davutoglu said at a news conference that the terrorist attack was carried out by ISIL takfiri groups. In assessing the political and security significance of the Marbar attack, several points can be made: 1. The terrorist attack in the great city of Istanbul means a threat to the security of Turkey's most important political, cultural, and economic city and an attack on the country's tourism industry. ISIL launched its terrorist attacks on Turkish soil from the Kurdish cities of Diyarbakir and Persos and then reached Ankara and finally Istanbul, but the important point about these four terrorist attacks is that ISIS is still in the attacks. They did not attack the Turks themselves. 3. The terrorist attack in Istanbul showed the fact that Turkey is heavily and easily exposed to the terrorist acts of ISIS, and given the 900 km length of the Turkish-Syrian border, the possibility of a repeat of such acts in Turkey is not far-fetched. This proves the fact that we must have a clear understanding of the security fears and concerns of the Turkish authorities regarding the existence of ISIL, and it is natural for Turkey to take a stand against ISIL. Although Turkey, in alliance with the United States and Europe, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, is on the front line in the fight against ISIS, it can not be expected that Turkey's actions against this takfiri group will be rapid, decisive and decisive; Because Ankara has to consider the reactions of ISIS inside Turkey in its military and security calculations (Khalili Nejad Kashkoui, Dehshiar, 2017: 98).

4-2. Long-term geopolitical perspectives of Turkey in Syria

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey have formed a completely destructive triangle against Syria, and since then Turkey has been designated as the gateway for Jabhat al-Nusra terrorist groups known as the Free Army and ISIS. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have provided a total of $ 36 billion in funding to terrorist groups over the past four years (Szenasi, 2019: 2). Turkey seeks to divide Idlib in Syria. Turkey annexed the Syrian province of Iskenderun in 1939; But it now seeks to impose Idlib, part of Iskenderun province, on its own territory so that it can have a transit road to Syria and Jordan and the entire Middle East region. With its historical past, it pointed out that in some cases, they
have revealed their territorial claims to the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, and even symbolically, a budget is considered by the parliament of this country for the mentioned areas every year. These areas were in fact separated from Turkey by Britain after World War I, much to the displeasure of Turkish politicians. Because the inhabitants of these areas are composed of Arab, Kurdish, and Turkish ethnicities, and the Turks, after separating this area, will annex the Kurdish areas to Turkey as Turks (Karimifard, 2017: 78). On October 7, 2017, Turkey sent troops to Idlib province for the second time. And this is the second Turkish invasion of Syria in 14 months, after the "Operation Euphrates Shield". Turkey's serious adventure policy is very likely to lead to its regional isolation as well as its distance from powerful NATO allies in the near future (Szenasi, 2019: 2).

4-3. Threats to the independence of the Syrian Kurdish

As Moton and Aramowitz believe, examining the "Kurdish aspects" of the Syrian crisis is the most important issue and concern (Babri, Ebrahimi, 2017: 170). Turkey hoped that the Syrian Kurds would become a passive and neutral force under heavy jihadist attacks and fail to reach a strategic and progressive coalition, but Turkey not only failed to achieve this hope, but the region once again sprouted pan-ideas. Not only did ISIS fail to overthrow the Kurds, but the group's attacks led to a sudden coalition of scattered Kurds and other Kurdish armed groups against a common enemy and the establishment of operations, command, mobilization, and organization centers in Syria. In fact, it meant finding a strategic depth. When the Kurds turned the Kobani battlefield against ISIS in their favor, they were able to strengthen their presence along the Turkish-Syrian border; Therefore, no one can deny that one of the most important winners in the Syrian process is the Kurds. The victory of the Kurds has several advantages for them and a threat to Turkey (Babri, Ebrahimi, 2017: 170). As the position of the Kurds in the Syrian crisis became more prominent, Turkey found itself with two enemies of the Assad government and the Syrian Kurds. Meanwhile, due to the imminent threat of the Kurds to Turkey's border security, the positions of the rulers of justice and development towards Assad himself became softer. In this regard, the Turkish government has focused on preventing the Kurdish currents from gaining power in northeastern Syria. Therefore, it is not without reason that the Turkish military has put the attack on Syrian Kurdish military bases on its main agenda in recent years. The tensions culminated in the capture of the strategic city of Manbij, a corridor for the transfer of ISIL equipment and troops through Turkey, to the Syrian Democratic Coalition. The presence of Kurdish forces in the city greatly worried the Turkish leaders, and the birth of…
Pavush Oglu in a statement on March 2, 2017 on the necessity of the withdrawal of Kurdish forces in the city, greatly worried the Turkish leaders, and the birth of Chavosh Oglu in a statement in the second month March 2017 stressed the need for Kurdish forces to leave the city of Manbij and said that the Turkish military is ready to enter the city (Babri, Shahrooz, 2017: 169).

Turkey's new policy in Syria at present (2019) focuses on the Kurdish military forces (YPG) and is mainly a direct use of military force or a threat to use military force. Ankara is seeking political supremacy in future military operations, although Turkey has maintained diplomatic diplomacy at the same time and has shown itself to be a flexible government in negotiations with Russia and the United States to better achieve this. Achieve his ambitious goals (Stiftung, 2019: 5). On October 17, 2019, an agreement was reached between the United States and Turkey for an immediate ceasefire. This agreement was in fact to strengthen relations between Turkey and NATO and also to strengthen the positions of ISIS, and thus the United States legitimized Turkey's interests on the southern borders of Syria (Kirby, 2019: 4). This legitimization of Turkish military action is a victory and a great achievement. It was considered for Turkey. The United States subsequently lifted many of Turkey's sanctions. In the same direction, on October 22, 2019, an agreement was signed between Turkey and Russia, which was considered a seal of approval for Turkey's military actions in Syria (Makernan, Botger, 2019). Following these agreements, Turkish military action intensified in Syria, and Turkey advanced to a depth of ten kilometers to establish a safe zone. And brought the Kurdish regions under military control.

Conclusion
As mentioned, Stephen Walt's defensive realism, in analyzing the causes of violent behavior of states in crises, mainly emphasizes the understanding that states have motivating threats to their national interests and goals. According to this school, governments will become more aggressive whenever they feel more threatened, especially if these threats and insecurities and the feeling of unrest spread by their neighbors, their behavior and approach to crises will be more aggressive. Therefore, it can be said that the degree of violence in the external behavior of governments in crises is a function of their perception of threats to their national interests. For this reason, it can be said that the policy of attitude towards western Turkey, which continued with little attention to regional considerations until the early 1960s, was faced with new internal and international variables, as well as crises. A region such as the Syrian crisis has led to a new, more aggressive foreign policy in the country's foreign policy.
As the AKP came to power, the Turkish government turned its attention to Middle East issues and sought to play a more active and aggressive role in the region. Of course, it should not be said that this focus of Turkey on the affairs and developments in the Middle East meant that the country turned away from its Western allies; On the contrary, with the start of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, Turkey, unlike in the past, tried to play a special role in regional politics and the Syrian crisis by using its geopolitical position and relations with the West and the Middle East. Thus, Turkey's foreign policy in the face of the Syrian crisis has been a function of the extent to which it understands the stimuli that threaten its national interests, so that by understanding the threat of extremists and instability within society, Turkey increased its military action on Syrian soil. Launched a missile near the Syrian border. In recent years, the Turkish military has also put attacks on Syrian Kurdish military bases on its main agenda, culminating in the conflict and military action when the strategic city of Manbij, a corridor for the transfer of ISIL equipment and troops through Turkey, was captured by the Syrian Democratic Coalition, and the Turkish government to advance the Kurds to a depth of ten kilometers to suppress the Kurds and sought to annex parts of the region to its territory in order to increase its strategic depth.
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